If there are many independent, identically distributed observations governed by a smooth, finite-dimensional statistical model, the Bayes estimate and the maximum likelihood estimate will be close. Furthermore, the posterior distribution of the parameter vector around the posterior mean will be close to the distribution of the maximum likelihood estimate around truth. Thus, Bayesian confidence sets have good frequentist coverage properties, and conversely. However, even for the simplest infinite-dimensional models, such results do not hold. The object here is to give some examples.
Introduction
With a large sample from a smooth, finite-dimensional statistical model, the Bayes estimate and the maximum likelihood estimate will be close. Furthermore, the posterior distribution of the parameter vector around the posterior mean must be close to the distribution of the maximum likelihood estimate around truth: both are asymptotically normal with mean 0, and both have the same asymptotic covariance matrix. That is the content of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem. Thus, a Bayesian 95%-confidence set must have frequentist coverage of about 95%, and conversely. In particular, Bayesians and frequentists are free to use each others' confidence sets. (Bayesians may view this as an advantage of their approach, since Bayesian confidence sets are relatively easy to obtain by simulation.) However, even for the simplest infinite-dimensional models, the Bernsteinvon Mises theorem does not hold (Cox, 1993) . The object here is to give some examples, which may help to clarify Cox's arguments.
The sad lesson for inference is this. If frequentist coverage probabilities are wanted in an infinite-dimensional problem, then frequentist coverage probabilities must be computed. Bayesians too need to proceed with caution in the infinite-dimensional case, unless they are convinced of the fine details of their priors. Indeed, the consistency of their estimates and the coverage probability of their confidence sets depend on the details of their priors. I suggest that similar conclusions apply to models with a finite-but large-number of parameters. The data swamp the prior only when the sample size is large relative to the number of parameters.
The examples in Cox (1993) involve continuous-time stochastic processes. Basically, there is an unknown smooth function, observed subject to random error at n points; the function is estimated using Bayesian techniques with a Gaussian prior. The examples here involve only sequences of independent normal variables, so that calculations can be done more or less explicitly. (Section 3 below indicates how Cox's examples connect with ours.) The setup is an extension of Lindley-Smith (1973) to infinitely many dimensions, and the model can be stated as follows.
(1) Y i = β i + i for i = 1, 2, . . . . The i are independent, identically distributed normal random variables, with mean 0 and positive variance σ 2 n → 0, while i β 2 i < ∞. In principle, the variables Y i and i in (1) need another subscript, n. For each n, the data consist of an infinite sequence {Y n,1 , Y n,2 , . . .} with Y n,i = β i + n,i . Intuitively, n stands for sample size. In the leading special case, {Y n,1 , Y n,2 , . . .} equals the mean of n observations on a parameter vector of infinite length. The parameter vector β does not depend on the sample size, but the law of the sampling error n,i certainly does. The theorems only involve the distribution of { n,i : i = 1, 2, . . .}, which are taken to be independent, identically distributed random variables, having mean 0 and variance σ 2 n → 0. The joint distribution of the doubly-infinite array { n,i : n = 1, 2, . . . , i = 1, 2, . . .} does not seem to matter for the results presented here. For finer estimates, however, assumptions would be needed on the doubly-infinite array. The subscript n will usually be omitted in what follows, to ease the notation.
The MLE for β is, of course, Y . We also consider a Bayesian analysis of (1), with the following prior:
(2) The β i are independent normal variables, with mean 0 and variance τ 2 i , where τ 2 i > 0 and i τ 2 i < ∞. The β's are independent of the 's. If (2) holds, then β 2 i < ∞ almost surely. It is of some importance that there are two variance scales, an "objective" one for the 's and a "subjective" one for the β's. The leading special case has σ 2 n = 1/n and τ 2 i = 1/i 2 , corresponding to the average of n independent observations on one sequence of β i 's, the prior being specified by the choice of τ i 's. Most of the inferential difficulties already appear when i is restricted to the finite-but growing-range i = 1, . . . , √ n. Iain Johnstone has suggested a variation on this setup which makes the calculations easier: set τ 2 i = 1/n for i = 1, . . . , n; now the prior too depends on n. Further examples with interesting behavior can be obtained by setting τ 2 i = A n /n for i = 1, . . . , n; when A n grows with n, Johnstone's example seems to have different asymptotics from ours.
Given (1) and (2), the posterior is readily computed, as in Proposition 1. Indeed, from the Bayesian perspective, Y i has conditional mean β i and conditional variance σ 2 n given β; unconditionally, however, Y i has mean 0 and variance
Proposition 1. For the Bayesian. Assume (1-2). Given the data Y , the β's are independent and normal. Moreover, (a)
In effect, the proposition defines a regular conditional distribution Q Y (dβ) for the parameter vector β given the data Y . If we consider only a finite number of β's, say β 1 , . . . , β k , the Q Y -distribution of {β i −β i : i = 1, . . . , k} is asymptotically the same as the frequentist distribution of {Y i −β i : i = 1, . . . , k}, namely, these are k independent normal variables with mean 0 and variance σ 2 n . For the frequentist and the Bayesian,β i − Y i = o P (σ n ). In other words, the difference between the MLE and the Bayes estimate is small compared to the randomness in either. Consequently, the posterior distribution of β aroundβ is essentially the same as the frequentist distribution ofβ around β. That is (a very special case of) the Bernstein-von Mises theorem. For a brief history of this theorem, see Lehmann (1991, p. 482) ; for its technical details, see LeCam and Yang (1990) or Prakasa Rao (1987) .
If we consider the full infinite-dimensional distribution, matters are quite different. To simplify the calculations, we assume (3a) σ 2 n = 1/n, (3b) τ 2 i ≈ A/i α as i → ∞, for 0 < A < ∞ and 1 < α < ∞, where s i ≈ t i if s i /t i → 1 and s i ∼ t i if s i /t i converges to a positive, finite limit. As noted above, condition (3a) obtains if, for instance, the data are obtained by averaging n IID observations on β. The joint distribution in n does not matter here. More general τ 2 i and σ 2 n are considered later. Theorem 1 below gives the Bayesian analysis; Theorem 2, the frequentist. Theorems 3 and 4 draw the implications. There is an 2 consistency result in Theorem 5. Section 2 has some complements and details. Section 3 makes the connection with stochastic processes. We focus on one infinite-dimensional functional-the square of the 2 norm. To state Theorem 1, let
For the frequentist, β ∈ 2 by assumption and T n < ∞ a.e. by Proposition 1(b); likewise for the Bayesian. On the other hand, Y / ∈ 2 , due to the action of .
Theorem 1. For the Bayesian. Assume (1)-(3). In particular, β is random. Then
The v ni are defined in Proposition 1(c); the random variable Z n has mean 0, variance 1, and converges in law to N(0,1) as n → ∞.
Proof. According to Proposition 1, given Y , T n is distributed as i v ni ξ 2 ni , the ξ ni being for each n independent N(0,1) variables as i varies. (Randomness in T n is driven by randomness in β.) Thus, E{T n |Y } = C n , which can be estimated as follows:
To get the last equality, set x = (An) 1/α u. This argument is heuristic but rigorizable. A variant on the idea is given by Lemma 2 in Section 2; see Remark (iii) (i) Proposition 1 shows that T n is independent of Y . For the Bayesian, the predictive distribution of T n coincides with its distribution given the data: the data are needed only to determineβ.
(ii) √ D n << C n because n −1+(1/2α) << n −1+1/α . If for instance α = 1/2, then E{T n } ∼ 1/n 1/2 but the randomness in T n is of order 1/n 3/4 . (We write x n << y n if x n /y n → 0.) (iii) Fix δ > 0 and β ∈ 2 . The posterior mass in a δ-ball aroundβ tends to 1 as n → ∞, for almost all data sets generated by (1). Indeed, E{T n } ∼ n −1+1/α → 0 and var T n ∼ n −2+1/α , so
which sums if for instance δ n ∼ 1/n 1/α and 2−1/α −2/α > 1. Thus, posterior mass concentrates aroundβ in the weak-star topology generated by the 2 norm, for almost all data generated by the model. Frequentist consistency for the Bayesian will follow-once we show thatβ is consistent, as in Theorem 5.
(iv) A law of the iterated logarithm is available for T n − E(T n ), as one sees by looking at
with I n , J n chosen so that τ 2 I n ≈ δ/n and τ 2 J n ≈ 1/(δn). This would require some appropriate joint distribution for the 's across n. Compare Cox (1993, pp.913ff ).
We pursue now the frequentist analysis of the Bayes estimates. From this perspective, β is an unknown parameter, not subject to random variation. However, some results can be proved only for "most" β-and the natural (if slightly confusing) measure to use is that defined by (2).
Theorem 2. For the frequentist. Assume (1) and (3) but not (2), so β is fixed but unknown. Then
where C n is as in Theorem 1, while V n (β, ·) has mean 0 and variance 1. If β is distributed according to (2), then U n (β) has mean 0, variance 1, and converges in law to N(0,1) as n → ∞. Furthermore,
V n (β, ·) converges in law to N(0,1).
Displays (7) and (8) hold as n → ∞, for almost all β's generated by (2).
This theorem is proved like Theorem 1. Tedious details, along with explicit formulae for F n , G n , U n , and V n , are postponed to Section 2. The theorem describes the asymptotic behavior of the Bayesian pivot, T n = β − β 2 , from a frequentist perspective. For this purpose, the frequentist agrees to use the same joint distribution for β and Y as the Bayesian. Of course, the Bayesian will compute L(T n |Y ). The frequentist cannot go that far, but considers L(T n |β). Among other things, the frequentist has agreed to ignore bad behavior for an exceptional null set of β's-relative to the prior (2). There are results on minimax rates for Bayes estimates, suggesting that β's exist for which the rate of convergence is slower than n −2+1/α , so the Bayesian null set may in some other sense be quite large. See or Brown, Low, and Zhao (1998) ; also see Section 4 below, and compare Theorem 3.1 in Cox (1993) .
Contrary to experience with the finite-dimensional case, there is a radical difference between the asymptotic behavior of L(T n |Y ) and the asymptotic behavior of L(T n |β)-even if we ignore the null set of bad β's. Our next main result is Theorem 3, which shows that the Bernstein-von Mises theorem does not apply in the infinite-dimensional context. There will be two reasons. Theorem 3. For the frequentist. Assume (1) and (3). The Bayesian posterior is computed from (2), and the frequentist conclusions apply to almost all β drawn from (2). The asymptotic variances D and G are defined in Theorems 1 and 2.
(a) G < D. In particular, the asymptotic frequentist variance is smaller than the asymptotic Bayes variance. (b) There is almost surely a sequence of n's tending to infinity such that the frequentist distribution of T n is centered to the right of the Bayes distribution by arbitrarily large multiples of n −1+1/(2α) , and likewise to the left.
Proof. The inequality in (a) is elementary: 2u α + 1 < (1 + u α ) 2 . Then use Corollary 1 to prove claim (b) . QED
The first part of the theorem-G < D -already shows that the conclusions of the Bernsteinvon Mises theorem do not hold. More particularly, F + G = D. A posteriori, the Bayesian sees β as centered atβ, so =β − β is centered at 0, and 2 is the squared length of a noise vector. For the frequentist, on the other hand,β is biased, is not centered at 0, some of 2 comes from bias and some from randomness. In effect, some Bayesian randomness is reinterpreted as bias. This effect is harder to see in a finite number of dimensions. For results showing that the Bayes bias term matters when rates of convergence are slower than 1/ √ n, see Brown and Liu (1993) or Pfanzagl (1998) . The second part of Theorem 3 shows that for certain random times, the posterior distribution of β aroundβ is nearly orthogonal to the frequentist distribution ofβ around β: recall that two probabilities µ and ν are "othogonal" if there is a set A with µ(A) = 1 and ν(A) = 0. This is perhaps a more poignant version of the failure in the conclusions of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem.
We now sharpen the orthogonality result. Consider the random variables
Let π n stand for the Bayesian distribution of W n1 , W n2 , . . . . This is the posterior distribution, centered and standardized; the randomness is in the parameters, not the data. (From the Bayesian perspective, the W 's are independent of the data.) Technically, π n is a probability on R ∞ , the space of sequences of real numbers. Let φ n,β be the frequentist distribution for the same random variables, with the signs reversed:
Now, β is fixed and the randomness is in the data. Again, φ n,β is a probability on R ∞ . There is a third distribution to consider: ψ n (β), the law of
For the frequentist, φ is the law of the Bayes estimates, centered at the true parameters; ψ is the law of the MLE, also centered at truth. For mathematical convenience, all three laws are standardized using the Bayesian variance; this common standardization cannot affect the orthogonality. (d) For any n and any β, β * ∈ 2 , the probabilities π n , φ n,β and ψ n,β * are pairwise orthogonal.
Claims (a), (b) and (c) are immediate from Proposition 1. The proof of (d) is deferred to Section 2, but the idea is simple: although the three probabilities merge on any fixed number of coordinates, the scales are radically different at ∞. The curious centering for φ cannot undo the scaling. In the frequentist vision of things, the MLE and the Bayes estimate are radically different. Moreover, the Bayesian a posteriori distribution for the parameters around the Bayes estimate is radically different from the frequentist distribution of the MLE around truth-or the frequentist distribution of the Bayes estimate around truth.
The last result in this section establishes the frequentist consistency of the Bayes estimates: the chance thatβ is close to β in 2 tends to 1 as n gets large. This theorem can be proved for any β ∈ 2 .
Theorem 5. Assume (1). The Bayes estimate computed from (2) is consistent for all β in 2 , namely, β − β 2 → 0 in probability. If (3) holds, convergence a.e. will obtain.
Proof. To begin with, by Proposition 1(b),
But w ni → 1 as n → 0 for each i. By dominated convergence, the first sum on the right in (9) tends to 0. The expection of the second sum is
Again, this goes to zero by dominated convergence: τ 2 i sums in i, while the coefficients are bounded above by 1/2 because ab/(a + b) 2 ≤ 1/2. This proves convergence in probability, and we turn to the a.e. result.
The variance of the second sum on the right in (9) is 8q n , where
If (3) holds, q n ∼ 1/n 2−1/α by Lemma 2 in Section 2, and q n < ∞; convergence a.e. follows from the Borel-Cantelli lemma. QED 2. Complements and details Lemma 1. Let 1 < α < ∞, 1 < b < ∞, and 0 ≤ c < ∞.
Proof. Let L be a large, positive real number. Of course,
Abbreviate γ = αb − c > 1, and let C γ be a suitable positive constant depending only on γ . We let h → 0 first, and then Lemma 3. Let c ni be constants with 0 < c 2 n = i c 2 ni < ∞, and max i |c ni | = o(c n ) as n → ∞. Let X ni be random variables which are independent in i for each n and have common distribution for all n and i. Suppose E{X ni } = 0 and
in law as n → ∞.
Proof. This is immediate from Lindeberg's theorem. QED Remark. It is enough that the X ni are uniformly L 2 , with constant variance. 
where exp(x) = e x . Likewise,
Proof. If U is N(0,1) and λ < .2, we claim
The inequality is strict except at λ = 0. To prove the inequality, square both sides and take logs: we have to prove f ≥ 0, with f (λ) = log(1 − 2λ) + 2λ + 6λ 2 . Now f (0) = f (0) = 0. And
21 . . . . In this range, f is strictly increasing and f is strictly convex, decreasing for λ < 0 and increasing for λ > 0. So f (λ) > 0 except at λ = 0, proving the inequality in (12).
Next,
by Chebychev's inequality. Choose θ = δ/(6c 2 ), which satisfies the condition θc i < .2 by assumption. The bound on P {V < −δ} follows, on changing the signs of all the c i . QED Proof of Theorem 2. To ease notation, we consider σ 2 n = 1/n and τ 2 i = 1/i α , so w ni = n/(n + i α ) and v ni = 1/(n + i α ) from Proposition 1. Modifications of the proof for τ 2 i = A/i α are obvious, and then τ 2 i ≈ A/i α is quite easy. Recall the definition (4) of T n . By Proposition 1,
where
Remark. In the finite-dimensional case, w ni ≈ 1 for n large; from either the Bayesian or the frequentist perspective, only the 2 -terms in R n (β, ) contribute to the asymptotic variance of T n . In the infinite case, Q n matters, and so do the β terms. That is the novelty.
By Proposition 1, C n matches the lead term in Theorem 1. We turn now to Q n (β). Let π stand for the prior distribution on β, as defined in (2). Clearly,
The ζ i are independent N(0,1) variables relative to π . In particular, E π {Q n (·)} = 0 and
which is (by definition) the F n in Theorem 2. Lemma 2 can be used to estimate F n , proving (6). The U n (β) in Theorem 2 is defined as Q n (β)/ √ F n . Of course, U n has mean 0 and variance 1 relative to π. Asymptotic normality follows from Lemma 3. The condition that max i |c ni | = o(c n ) follows, as before, from Lemma 2. Next, we need to consider R n . Here, the computation is more intricate. We begin with the sum of the β terms. Fix any β ∈ 2 . As before, let ζ i (β) = √ i α β i . Also let
, where ξ ni = √ n i is N(0,1), so k ni is the coefficient of an N(0,1) variable in the expansion of R n . In any event,
By Lemma 2,
We claim that
for almost all β drawn from (2). Indeed,
Now use Lemma 4, with K 2 ni for c i . Lemma 2 shows that max i K 2 ni ∼ 1/n 2 and i K 4 ni ∼ 1/n 4−1/α . Fix δ 0 > 0 but small, and use δ 0 /n 2−1/α for the δ of Lemma 4:
which sums in n, proving (19). The condition of the lemma holds if δ 0 is small. We turn now to the sum of the 2 terms in R n . Recall that
Here, k ni (β) depends on β while ni is deterministic. And the two seem to be on different scales.
(With more effort, however, the scales can be seen as comparable, for the i's that matter. In any case, the total variances are comparable, as will be seen below.) Lemma 3 does not apply, and a direct appeal must be made to Lindeberg's theorem. First, however,
The G n (β) of Theorem 2 is defined as
the factor of 2 being the variance of ξ 2 ni − 1. And the V n (β, ) of the theorem is
Estimates (18), (19) and (21) give a (painful) verification of (7). Fix δ > 0 small. Except for a set of β's of measure 0, |ζ i (β)| < i δ for all but finitely many i, and n (β) = o 1/n 2−1/α by (19). For the remaining β's, we claim, V n (β, ·) converges in law to N(0,1) as n → ∞. This will be demonstrated by verifying the Lindeberg condition. The condition involves estimating a series of integrals of the form
where a is a small multiple of the asymptotic standard deviation. Now |U + V | > 2a entails |U | > a or |V | > a, and (U + V ) 2 ≤ 2(U 2 + V 2 ), so each integral can be estimated according to the scheme
To flesh this out, the variance of 20) . We need to show that
with κ a generic small number. In view of (23), we need only show that
We begin with S 1,n . Recall the definition (16) . Consequently, the ith term in S 1,n is bounded by
from which it is immediate that S 1,n = o(s 2 n ). Indeed, for our β's, i k ni (β) 2 ∼ 1/n 2−1/α ∼ s 2 n . The argument for S 3,n is similar but easier, because ni = n/(n + i α ) 2 < 1/n. In S 2,n ,
The ith term in S 2,n is therefore bounded by
from which it is immediate that S 2,n = o(s 2 n ). The argument for S 4,n is similar. We have verified the Lindeberg condition, proving (8) and so the theorem. QED Remarks.
(i) As shown by Proposition 1(b), the term √ F n U n (β) = Q n (β) in (5) is the squared norm of the Bayes bias, centered at its mean relative to the prior defined by (2). It is this deviation which wobbles on the scale of interest.
(ii) The proof exploits the fact that ξ 2 − 1 is a function of ξ . However, the two variables are uncorrelated: asymptotically, the sum of the β terms in R n is therefore independent of the sum of the 2 terms. This would follow from the bivariate form of Lindeberg's theorem. On the other hand, (23) is enough to derive the requisite bivariate form of the theorem from the univariate.
Proof of Corollary 1. The argument starts from (14), where ζ i (β) = √ τ i β i is a sequence of IID N(0,1) variables that does not depend on n. The F n in Theorem 2 is the right hand side of (15), while U n (β) = Q n (β)/ √ F n . Fix a positive integer j . Now {U n > j i.o.} is a tail set relative to the ζ 's, by Lemma 2(b). This set has positive probability, by asymptotic normality; hence, the probability is 1. Likewise for −∞. QED
Proof of Theorem 4(d).
The two probabilities in a pair are either equivalent or singular, and Kakutani's criterion can be used to decide. See, for instance, Williams (1991) . Fix n, and β ∈ 2 . By Proposition 1, w ni → 0 as i → ∞. If we compare π with φ, the frequentist variance for the ith variable is neglible relative to the Bayes variance; for equivalence to obtain, the ratio of the variances would need to tend to 1. Likewise for the other comparisons.
Faster decay rates
Theorem 2 depends on the assumed tail behavior of the prior variances τ 2 i . In particular, if α is large, the wobbly middle term in (5) is relatively small. As it turns out, with faster decay rates, this middle term is negligible. So the conclusions of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem apply to our quadratic functional even with infinitely many parameters. To simplify the notation, we consider only σ 2 n = 1/n and τ 2 i = e −αi .
Proof. Claim (a). The sum to be estimated is n −b S n , where
Fix L 0 , a large positive integer. Let L n be the integer part of log(n 1/α ) − L 0 . Each term in S n is bounded above by 1, and each of the first L n terms is bounded below by 1/[1+exp(−αL 0 )] b , which is rather close to 1. The sum of the first L n terms in S n is therefore essentially L n ≈ log(n 1/α ). The sum of the remaining terms is bounded above by
Claim (b) . Let L n be the integer part of log(n 1/α ). The sum to be estimated is n −b+c/α S n , where
Similarly, an asymptotic lower bound is
QED
Theorem 6. Assume (1). Instead of (3), suppose σ 2 n = 1/n and v i = e −αi where 0 < α < ∞. The posterior is computed from (2), and frequentist probability statements about β are also made relative to (2). In probability, as n → ∞, the frequentist distribution of β −β 2 merges with the Bayesian distribution.
Proof. Theorem 1 and its proof go through, with C n ≈ (log n)/(αn) and D n ≈ (2 log n)/(αn 2 ). Theorem 2 also goes through; now, however, F n = O(1/n 2 ) is too small to matter: in the notation of this section, Q n (β) can be ignored. We turn now to R n (β, ) . The sum of the 2 terms has asymptotic variance (2 log n)/(αn 2 ), like the Bayesian variance. It remains only to show that the total frequentist variance of the β terms in R n is O(1/n 2 ), in probability, for β chosen from (2). Let V n (β) be the variance of these β terms. Then
where, as before, ζ i (β) = √ e αi β i are independent N(0,1) variables. We compute the expected value and variance of V n (·), relative to the probability π on β defined by (2): E π {V n (·)} = O(1/n 2 ) and
by Lemma 5. QED Remarks.
(i) The statement of Theorem 6 can be clarified as follows. For β ∈ 2 , let φ n,β be the
Here, the randomness is in β, because T n is-for the Bayesian-independent of Y . Let ρ metrize the weak-star topology on probabilities in R 1 and let ν be the standard normal distribution. Then ρ(φ n,β , ν) → 0 in probability as n → 0, where "in probability" is relative to the probability on β's defined by (2). Furthermore, ρ(π n , ν) → 0. Stronger metrics could be used, but that is perhaps not the critical issue here.
(ii) Preliminary calculations suggest that Theorem 6 does not hold a.e.-that is, ρ(φ n,β , ν) does not converge to 0 for almost all β drawn from (2)-because there are arbitrarily large random n with V n ∼ log n/n 2 . In other words, the Bayes bias term shows a limited degree of wobble, almost surely. Indeed, n 2 V n = i c ni ζ 2 i where c ni = O(1), with a maximum at i = L n or L n + 1, where L n is the integer part
As i moves away from L n , the c ni decay exponentially. If K is a convenient large positive integer, the i with |i − L n | > K can be ignored, by Lemma 4. As n increases, there are infinitely many disjoint segments I n = {i : |i − L n | ≤ K}. The ζ 's in these segments are independent, and P i∈I n c ni ζ 2 i > C log n is governed by the behavior for i = L n or L n + 1. Finally, there will almost surely be arbitrarily large i with ζ 2 i ∼ log i. (iii) There is another way to salvage Bernstein-von Mises. Suppose (1)- (2)- (3), with σ 2 n = 1/n and τ 2 i = 1/i 2 . Instead of the 2 -norm β −β 2 , consider i β i −β i 2 /i γ . If γ < 1/2, previous results apply, but Bayesians and frequentists merge when γ ≥ 1/2. Of course, Theorem 4 remains in force: the merging is only for a particular functional.
(iv) The a.e. consistency results-Theorem 5 and Remark (iii) to Theorem 1-depend on the behavior of σ 2 n . For slow rates of convergence to 0, a.e. consistency will depend on the joint distribution of the errors across n. A simple example may illustrate the point: suppose U n is N(0, σ 2 n ). If σ 2 n = 1/n, then U n → 0 a.e.-for any joint distribution. On the other hand, suppose σ 2 1 = 2 and σ 2 n = 1/ log n for n > 1. If the U n are independent, convergence a.e. fails. If U n = V 1 + · · · + V n , the V i being independent N(0, τ 2 i ) variables with τ 2 1 + · · · + τ 2 n = σ 2 n , convergence a.e. will hold.
Stochastic processes
The lead example in Cox (1993) is once-integrated Brownian motion on the unit interval, which is used as a prior on functions β in the model y i = β(i/n) + i , the being IID N(0,σ 2 ) variables. Eigenvalue expansions of the Karhunen-Loève type transform such problems into discrete problems. We could not find the eigenvalues of integrated Brownian motion in the literature, and give an informal account here-with many thanks to David Brillinger, who showed us all the interesting tricks. On the equivalence between white-noise problems and non-parametric regression or density estimation, see Low (1996) or Nussbaum (1996) .
Let B s be standard Brownian motion, so E{B s } = 0 and cov(B s , B t ) = min(s, t). Onceintegrated Brownian motion is X t = t 0 B s ds. Plainly, E{X t } = 0. Furthermore,
Then for 0 ≤ s ≤ t, 
K(s, t)φ i (s) ds = λ i φ i (t)
and
the Z i being IID N(0,1) variables. Analytically,
For the existence of eigenfunctions and eigenvalues, and the expansion, see Riesz and Nagy (1955, Section 97) .
Our objective is to solve equation (24). Dropping subscripts and rewriting, we get
Successive differentiations with respect to t give
The boundary conditions-from (25)-(28)-are
The solution to (29) is Solve each equation for A/B in terms of θ and equate the results, to see that
cos θ cosh θ = −1.
Plainly, the roots θ i of (32) Remark. In short, τ 2 i ∼ 1/i 4 in Theorems 1-3 corresponds to integrated Brownian motion. By a more direct calculation, τ 2 i ∼ 1/i 2 corresponds to Brownian motion itself. In this case, of course, everything can be written down explicitly: the ith eigenvalue is λ i = 1/[(2i − 1)π/2] 2 , and the corresponding eigenfunction is φ i (t) = A sin(t/ √ λ i ).
The exceptional null set
We consider the structure of the exceptional null set in Theorem 2. To simplify matters, take
Recall thatβ n is the Bayes estimate computed from the prior defined by (2). According to Theorem 2, for almost all β drawn from (2), β n − β 2 is of order 1/n 1/2 . There is a wobbly "Bayes bias" term √ F n U n (β), with F n ∼ n −3/2 . Being standard normal, U n (β) = O √ log n a.s. In short, the Bayes bias term is O √ log n/n 3/4 a.s.; finer results, of course, can be proved. There is also randomness of order 1/n 3/4 , due to the 's. The next theorem shows that for a dense set of exceptional β's, β n − β 2 is of much larger order 1/n ρ , with randomness of order 1/ √ n 1+ρ , where ρ is a small positive number at our disposition. is negligible, while 1 n
is negligible. We have not checked details, but asymptotic normality must follow. QED
The situation is more manageable if we ignore the variances and consider only
As shown in Theorem 5, φ n (β) → 0 as n → ∞ for any β ∈ 2 . However, the rate of convergence can be arbitrarily slow for most β's-if "most" is defined in a topological sense. That is the content of the next theorem. The setting is 2 , which is a complete separable metric space. A G δ is a countable intersection of open sets. If each of these open sets is dense, so is the intersection: that is the "Baire property." Dense G δ 's are the topological analogs of sets of measure 1, and are large "in the sense of category"; see Oxtoby (1980) for discussion.
Theorem 9. Assume (1) and (33). Let 0 < a n ↑ ∞ be a sequence of real numbers that is strictly increasing to ∞, no matter how slowly. Then {β : lim sup n a n φ n (β) = ∞} is a dense G δ .
Proof. By (35), φ n is continuous. So 
F (N, M)
is a countable union of closed nowhere dense sets, and the argument is done.
To show F (N, M) is nowhere dense, fix β * ∈ F (M, N). We will approximate β * by β's with lim n a n φ n (β) > M. Let Let β i = β * i for i = 1, . . . , i 0 − 1 and β i = 0 for i ≥ i 0 . We estimate φ n (β) using equations (35-38). As before, T 0 = O(1/n 2 ). But now, T 1 = 0 so the dominant term is T 2 ≈ n −1/2 c 1 . For claim (b), equations (35) and (38) give the lower bound, with all β i = 0. QED To summarize, for most β's in the sense of measure, the mean squared error of the Bayes estimate is Cn −1/2 with C = ∞ 0 1/(1 + u 2 ) du. For most β's in the sense of category, the rate (along certain subsequences of n's) is c 1 n −1/2 , where c 1 < C. Along other subsequences, the rate is much slower than n −1/2 -as much slower as you please. There are general results on minimax rates of convergence and consistency of Bayes estimates in or Brown, Low, and Zhao (1998) .
